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Worldwide concern over the state of the environment has resulted in a major effort
in Europe to develop expanded mechanisms for environmental regulation. These
efforts are being monitored closely by American businesses contemplating ventures
in Europe and elsewhere. Dissatisfied with both the pace and substantive content of
these regulatory efforts, some environmental groups have attempted to extend judi-
cially the application of U.S. environmental standards to ventures in other countries.
In so doing, the debate over the nature and extent of environmental regulation in
Europe and elsewhere may shift to American agencies and courts. More impor-
tantly, the imposition of the U.S. environmental regulatory regime abroad undoubt-
edly will have a dramatic impact on the cost of doing business overseas and could
expose U.S. firms to liability for environmental contamination in other countries.
This article discusses two recent U.S. judicial decisions that define the extent
to which certain procedural requirements of U.S. environmental laws may be
applied to activities abroad. Also discussed is proposed legislation seeking to
apply substantive U.S. standards for waste handling to foreign countries that
receive U.S. waste exports.
I. Extending Procedural Requirements to Cover United States
Government Involvement in Foreign Activities
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that a requirement for interagency consultation imposed by
the Endangered Species Act of 19732 (ESA) is applicable to foreign projects
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1. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
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funded in whole or in part by U.S. government agencies. ESA directs each
federal agency to consult with the Interior Department to ensure that "any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency. . . is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species" or adversely affect the
habitat of such species. 3 The statute imposes the consultation duty without ad-
dressing the distinction between domestic and foreign projects in which the
United States participates.
Prior to 1986 the Interior Department had considered the consultation duty to
be applicable to overseas federal projects and published regulations to that ef-
fect.4 In 1986, however, the agency reversed itself and issued a new rule that
limited the consultation obligation to agency participation in activities or projects
taking place "in the United States or upon the high seas." 5 In the preamble to the
1986 rule the agency attributed this policy shift to "the apparent domestic ori-
entation of the consultation and exemption processes" following the 1978
amendments to ESA and "the potential for interference with the sovereignty of
foreign nations.' '6
Several environmental organizations, led by Defenders of Wildlife, immedi-
ately brought suit to challenge the Interior Department's new interpretation of
ESA's consultation requirement. In 1989 the U.S. District Court for Minnesota
ruled in favor of Defenders of Wildlife. The court ordered the Interior Depart-
ment to revoke its 1986 rule regarding consultations and to issue new rules
7
reinstating the applicability of the consultation duty to foreign projects.
The Interior Department appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit. The
agency argued that the application of the consultation requirement to foreign
projects would intrude improperly upon the sovereign right of foreign nations to
strike their own balance between resource development and protection of endan-
gered species. The appellate court rejected the agency's contentions, however,
concluding instead that Congress had evinced a clear intent to require inter-
agency consultations regarding the impact on endangered species of all projects
and activities, be they foreign or domestic, in which the federal government
participated. In the court's view the plain language of ESA imposed the con-
sultation duty upon "any action authorized, funded, or carried out by" a federal
agency, and did not distinguish between foreign and domestic projects.8
The court found substantial evidence within ESA of congressional concern
over the protection of endangered species worldwide. Specifically, ESA declares
3. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
4. See 43 Fed. Reg. 870 (1978).
5. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990).
6. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,929 (codified with some differences in language at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01
(1990)).
7. Defenders of the Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 911 F.2d 117
(8th Cir. 1990).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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that "the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international
community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or
wildlife and plants facing extinction" and that one of the goals of ESA is to take
appropriate steps to achieve the purposes of the various international treaties and
conventions adopted by the United States that seek to protect endangered spe-
cies. 9 In addition, ESA directs the Interior Department to promulgate a list of
species found to be endangered after giving actual notice to, and inviting com-
ment from, foreign countries in which such species proposed for listing are
found. '0 The listing process does not distinguish between domestic and foreign
species. The court thus concluded that ESA, viewed as a whole, "clearly dem-
onstrates congressional commitment to worldwide conservation efforts. To limit
the consultation duty in a manner which protects only domestic endangered
species runs contrary to such a commitment.""l
Finally, the court pointed to the Interior Department's 1978 rule which, as
noted above, extended the consultation duty to overseas federal projects. Fol-
lowing the issuance of this rule, Congress amended ESA's consultation provision
to reflect its current form. While the amendments did not touch upon the appli-
cability of the consultation duty to foreign projects, their congressional authors
expressed an intent to retain the existing law and the implementing regulations,
since they were "familiar to most Federal agencies and have received substantial
judicial interpretation." 12 The Defenders court found that, because the "existing
law" in 1978 included the regulation requiring consultation on foreign projects,
Congress tacitly had approved the prior regulatory interpretation of the consul-
tation provision. 13
II. A More Restrictive View of
Extraterritorial Application
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit decision, a U.S. district judge in Hawaii, in
a case shortly following Defenders, weighed similar factors and concluded that
the procedural requirements imposed by another environmental statute, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), '4 could be applied extrater-
ritorially only in limited circumstances.' 
5
NEPA requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) in
connection with "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
9. Id. § 1531(a)-(b).
10. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(B).
11. Defenders of the Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 177, 123 (8th Cir. 1990).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 9451, 9486.
13. Defenders, 911 F.2d at 124.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
15. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 758-61 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed,
924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
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human environment." 1 6 A "major federal action" is not limited to government
initiatives; it includes any private venture or undertaking that is potentially
subject to federal financing, assistance, regulation, or approval. 17 The EIS must
address the environmental impact of the proposed action, any unavoidable ad-
verse environmental impact should the proposal be implemented, and alterna-
tives to the proposed action.' 8 Like the Endangered Species Act discussed above,
NEPA does not distinguish between domestic and foreign projects.
The Greenpeace case concerned the U.S. Army's role in the removal and
destruction of certain unitary and now obsolete chemical weapons (the European
stockpile or the stockpile) that had been deployed in West Germany in 1968. In
1986 the United States and West German Governments agreed to remove the
stockpile from German soil by December 1992. Congress subsequently required
that the entire U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons be destroyed no later
than April 1997.19
In March 1989 the United States and West Germany agreed to step up the April
1992 deadline for removal of the stockpile to December 1990. The two countries
worked out a joint plan to transport the stockpile from its current storage site in
Clausen, Germany, to Johnston Atoll, an unincorporated U.S. territory located in
the central Pacific Ocean, for ultimate incineration in the Johnston Atoll Chem-
ical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). JACADS currently is the United States'
only operational site for the destruction of such chemical munitions. Under the
agreement the stockpile would be loaded into secondary containers and trans-
ported by truck and rail from Clausen to Germany's port of Nordenham on the
North Sea. Next, the munitions would be shipped through international waters
to Johnston Atoll, where they would be stored and ultimately incinerated in
JACADS.
The Army, for purposes of complying with NEPA's EIS requirements, divided
the project into three separate components: (1) the movement of the stockpile
within Germany from Clausen to Nordenham; (2) the transport of the stockpile
from Nordenham through international waters to Johnston Atoll; and (3) the
disembarkation of the weapons at Johnston Atoll, and their storage and ultimate
incineration at JACADS. The Army never contested NEPA's applicability to
Segment 3 of the project and published three EISs regarding JACADS. The
Army's 1983 EIS addressed the construction and operation of JACADS. The
second EIS, issued in 1988, covered the disposal of solid and liquid wastes that
JACADS itself would produce. Finally, the Army published a second supple-
mental EIS in 1990, which specifically addressed the unloading, storage, and
disposal of the European stockpile at Johnston Atoll.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1990).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1521(a)-(b) (1988).
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The Army also prepared a Global Commons Environmental Assessment
(GCEA), which addressed Segment 2 of the project, the shipment of the muni-
tions through international waters from the North Sea to Johnston Atoll, The
GCEA concluded that the shipments would cause only "the same environmental
impacts as from the passage of any modem commercial ship."
20
The Army declined to issue any environmental impact assessment, however,
with regard to Segment I of the project, the transport of the stockpile within
Germany, which the Army maintained was beyond the scope of NEPA. This
phase of the project Was reviewed by a German court, which examined the
proposed transport plan and safety measures and found them to be in accordance
with German law.
2 1
In August 1990 a number of environmental organizations, led by Greenpeace,
filed suit against the Army, seeking to block the proposed transport of the
European stockpile from Germany to Johnston Atoll.22 Greenpeace claimed that
the U.S. Army's involvement -in the project made NEPA fully applicable to all
aspects of the proposed transportation and disposal of the European stockpile.
Greenpeace therefore asserted that the Army violated NEPA by failing to issue
a comprehensive EIS covering the transportation of the stockpile within Ger-
many and, subsequently, through international waters.
The Army countered that the scope of NEPA does not reach the transport of
the stockpile within Germany and, therefore, no EIS was required. The Army
maintained that NEPA did not purport to apply to federal actions taken outside
the United States. It urged the court to adhere to the traditional principle of
statutory interpretation restricting federal statutes to domestic applications, ab-
sent clear evidence of congressional intent to the contrary. Further, the Army
argued that the application of NEPA to the intra-Germany transport of the Eu-
ropean stockpile would improperly infringe upon Germany's sovereignty and
also would invade the President's discretion to determine the foreign policy of
the United States.
The court agreed with the Army and found NEPA applicable to the movement
of the European stockpile within Germany. The court expressly limited its find-
20. 749 F. Supp. at 754. The Army's GCEA, which is less comprehensive than an EIS, was
prepared pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979), which requires federal
agencies to evaluate the environmental impact of their actions taken outside the territorial United
States and to issue "environmental impact statements" pertaining to such actions. Id. § 2-4(a)(i), 44
Fed. Reg. at 1958. The order was inapplicable to the movement of the European stockpile within
Germany because it only requires an environmental evaluation of the impact upon "a foreign nation
not participating with the United States and not otherwise involved in the action." Id. § 2-3(b), 44
Fed. Reg. at 1957. In this instance, the West German Government was participating actively in the
federal project. Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. at 754.
21. Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. at 754 (citing Translation of the Decision of the Administrative
Court of Cologne, Eric Neumayer v. Fed. Rep. Germany (July 20, 1990)).
22. Greenpeace also raised issues regarding the destruction of the stockpile at Johnston Atoll.
These claims were not addressed by the trial court's opinion, however, which dealt only with the
environmentalists' request for a preliminary injunction against the transportation of the stockpile.
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ings, however, to the particular facts incident to this dispute and noted that
NEPA's EIS requirements could in some circumstances reach federal projects
taking place exclusively within foreign jurisdictions. The court found that the
potential conflict between NEPA and the United States' foreign policies that U.S.
action overseas necessarily entails "caused Congress to leave open the question
of whether NEPA applies to the environmental impacts of federal action
abroad. ' 23 Accordingly, the court held that NEPA's extraterritorial application
could only be determined on a case-specific basis.
The court, in concluding that the transport of the European stockpile within
Germany did not warrant NEPA's extraterritorial application, focused on a num-
ber of factors particular to this case. First, the removal of the European stockpile
from Germany was an action undertaken by the United States Government with
the encouragement, cooperation, and approval of the West German Government.
The stockpile had been situated in Germany at the sufferance of the host country,
and the United States had committed itself to remove the weapons by the end of
1990 based upon foreign policy considerations that the court considered to be
beyond the purview of its scrutiny.24 The court also held that the extraterritorial
application of NEPA to the transport of the European stockpile within Germany
would infringe the sovereignty and authority of the German Government over
actions taken within its borders. The German Government had already consid-
ered the environmental risks incident to the internal transport of the stockpile and
had found such risks acceptable in light of the benefits to be derived from
expeditiously ridding the country of unitary chemical weapons.
25
Thus, the court found that the extraterritorial application of NEPA to the
movement of the stockpile within Germany would interfere with the President's
foreign policy, and with a specific agreement between the United States and a
foreign sovereign, in a manner not intended or anticipated by Congress.26 The
court reiterated, however, that its decision was limited to the facts presented in
this case and that, in other circumstances, NEPA's requirements could reach
overseas activities in which the federal government participated, "especially
where [the] United States agency's action abroad has direct environmental im-
pacts within this country, or where there has been a total lack of environmental
assessment by the federal agency or foreign country involved."
27
23. Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. at 761.
24. Id. at 760.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 761. For these same reasons, the court found that the Army's preparation of the
less-comprehensive GCEA in connection with the transoceanic shipment of the stockpile through the
Global Commons satisfied the requirements of NEPA.
27. Id. The court also disposed of Greenpeace's claims that were unrelated to the extraterritorial
application of NEPA. Specifically, Greenpeace had alleged that the Army failed to consider certain
additional information in preparing its second supplemental EIS; that the Army had failed to evaluate
a full range of alternatives to disposal of the weapons at JACADS; that the proposal violated certain
congressional directives regarding the certification of JACADS; and that the proposal violated two
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Greenpeace subsequently appealed the trial court's decision to permit the
transfer of the European stockpile to Johnston Atoll. However, by the time the
appeal reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the transfer had been com-
pleted and the appellate court therefore dismissed the appeal as moot.
28
III. Extending NEPA's Reach
Although the Greenpeace case severely limited the extraterritorial application
of NEPA, the statute ultimately may be broadened through legislative action to
reach foreign projects. In 1989, the Senate considered legislation to extend
NEPA's coverage to include "extraterritorial actions (other than those taken to
protect the national security of the United States, actions taken in the course of
an armed conflict, strategic intelligence actions, armament transfers, or judicial
or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions)." 29 The proposal, which
ultimately was not adopted, also would have required "full consideration of the
environmental impacts of proposed major Federal agency actions on geographic,
oceanographic, and atmospheric areas within as well as beyond the jurisdiction
of the United States and its territories and possessions." 30 Although this proposal
was unsuccessful, its sponsors are likely to pursue the issue further in the 102d
Congress.
The development of NEPA's extraterritorial application merits close attention
by anyone contemplating a foreign venture that in any way requires United States
Government approval or participation. While NEPA is a procedural statute and
does not purport to apply substantive U.S. environmental standards to agency
decision making, NEPA's EIS process does require federal agencies to initiate
lengthy environmental reviews of a proposed action, often at considerable ex-
pense to the private applicant who is seeking government approval of, or par-
ticipation in, certain aspects of the project. In these circumstances the applicant
must develop and present information to the agency concerning the environmen-
tal impact of the proposed project, as well as alternatives to the project. This
administrative process, which leads to the preparation of the EIS, is subject to
public participation and judicial review. Consequently, the application of NEPA
to foreign actions involving United States Government participation would bring
international treaties concerning the transport and disposal of hazardous substances, the Basel Con-
vention on the international movement of hazardous wastes and the London Convention on ocean
dumping. In rejecting these contentions, the court found that: (1) the Army acted within its discretion
in declining to amend the second supplemental EIS to include certain new data produced by Green-
peace; (2) the Army had properly considered a full range of alternatives to the proposed disposal at
JACADS; (3) Greenpeace did not have standing to challenge the Army's compliance with the
certification requirements regarding JACADS or with the Basel Convention; and (4) the London
Convention was inapplicable to the on-land disposal of substances at JACADS. Id. at 764-67.
28. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
29. See S. 1089, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in S. REP. No. 352, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1990).
30. Id. at 23.
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many aspects of those projects (including their environmental impacts, the ca-
pacity of foreign governmental agencies to manage these impacts, and alterna-
tives to the proposed actions) under the scrutiny of U.S. agencies and courts,
which, in reviewing the proposals, would be guided by U.S. law.
IV. Extending Substantive U.S. Environmental
Standards to Foreign Countries Through the
Regulation of Hazardous Waste Exports
The proposed application of substantive U.S. environmental standards to for-
eign countries that receive U.S. exports of hazardous wastes raises even greater
concerns for the international community. The United States currently regulates
the export of hazardous waste through section 30L7 of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA prohibits the export of hazardous
waste from the United States unless the shipment conforms to an international
agreement between the United States and the receiving country's government
that addresses hazardous waste exports. If no international agreement is in force,
RCRA prohibits hazardous waste exports unless the exporter notifies EPA of the
types and quantities of waste exported, and the receiving country consents to
accept the shipment.
32
A. PROPOSALS FOR A WASTE EXPORT CONTROL AcT
In 1989 Representative Thomas Luken (D.-Ohio) introduced H.R. 3736, the
Waste Export Control Act, which would have broadened RCRA's application to
cover the export of solid wastes and to increase the scope of regulation over
waste treatment and disposal facilities in foreign countries. 33 Luken's proposal
ultimately expired with the 101 st Congress, but is expected to be reintroduced as
part of, or in conjunction with, legislation to amend or reauthorize RCRA.
Luken's proposal would ban the export of certain categories of wastes to
countries whose environmental standards are less strict than those of the United
States. The proposal is premised on the implementation of the multilateral 1989
Basel Convention, which prohibits the export of hazardous waste, incinerator
ash, and municipal waste unless a bilateral or multilateral agreement provides
that the receiving nation will manage the waste in an "environmentally sound
manner." 
34
31. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988).
32. The EPA's regulation concerning hazardous waste exports is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 262,50-.58
(1990).
33. H.R. 3736, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
34. Final Act of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, art. 4(8), 28 I.L.M. 657, 663
(1989).
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Luken's proposal would ban the export of solid and hazardous wastes from the
United States unless the United States and the country receiving such waste were
parties to an agreement enabling the United States to ensure that the transpor-
tation, treatment, storage, and disposal of exported solid and hazardous waste
would be conducted in a manner that, if conducted in the United States, would
satisfy the requirements of RCRA. At a minimum, such agreements would have
to include a right of access by the United States to the foreign facilities used to
manage exported solid and hazardous waste. In addition, all solid and hazardous
waste export agreements currently in force would ultimately have to include
mechanisms that enabled the United States to determine that a foreign country
managed waste in a manner no less stringent than mandated by RCRA require-
ments. This "no less stringent than RCRA" standard would bring into question
any foreign waste management system, however sophisticated.
Moreover, the proposal would establish a permit program for exporters of
solid or hazardous waste that would require disclosure of extensive and poten-
tially sensitive information by exporters. Each permit applicant would have to
provide EPA with the type, quantities, and concentrations of waste exported; a
demonstration that the exported waste would be transported, treated, stored, and
disposed of in a manner at least as stringent as that required under RCRA;
evidence that the foreign facility operator has adequate financial resources to pay
cleanup and liability costs that may be imposed under U.S. law or the laws of the
receiving country; the names of all persons holding more than 5 percent of the
equity in the exporter's business; and any other information EPA might require
relating to the "competency, reliability or good character of the applicant.' 35 In
addition, EPA's National Enforcement Investigations Center would have to pre-
pare an investigative report on the exporter before EPA issued a waste export
permit.
To ensure compliance with the waste export regulatory program, EPA would
be authorized to inspect the facilities of a permit holder and any foreign facilities
receiving solid or hazardous waste exported from the United States. Finally, the
proposal would authorize foreign governments to bring actions for response costs
or natural resource damages in U.S. courts under section 107 of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 198636 if
hazardous waste caused the foreign government to incur such costs or damages.
V. Conclusion
Efforts to extend the protections of U.S. environmental laws beyond the
nation's borders reflect both altruistic and self-serving motivations. On the one
hand, many in the United States seek to protect environmental conditions in other
35. H.R. 3736, supra note 33, § 2(b)(16).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
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countries, many of which lack the legal mechanisms and enforcement resources
necessary to safeguard their environment from harmful wastes and environmen-
tally unsound practices. On the other hand, environmental degradation is rarely
confined to specific geographic areas and can prove costly to all nations, be it in
the form of ocean dumping, deforestation, greenhouse gases, or ozone depletion.
Traditionally, the global community has relied on multilateral negotiations and
agreements such as the Basel Convention to address such international problems.
Such agreements, however, take years to complete and often contain only vague
and indefinite standards with ineffective enforcement mechanisms. These short-
comings are precisely those that have led to unilateral efforts to protect the global
environment. While U.S. laws may provide convenient, familiar standards by
which to promote international environmental protection, the unilateral applica-
tion of such laws to other countries denies those countries' governments the
opportunity to adopt modem standards to fit their particular needs. Such appli-
cation also rekindles the long-standing debate over the extent to which prosper-
ous, industrialized nations should attempt to impose their own views of the
proper balance of economic development and environmental protection upon the
rest of the global community.
At all events, companies conducting business abroad have good reason to
monitor these developments closely. While such companies may comply fully
with the environmental responsibilities imposed by the countries in which they
do business, they may ultimately find themselves saddled with new and poten-
tially burdensome obligations imposed by the United States. Such companies,
therefore, should take action now to limit future environmental liabilities by
reviewing and modifying their compliance procedures in light of these emerging
extraterritorial standards.
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